INTRODUCTION
Economic models built around rational self-interested agents are rarely, if ever, accurate as literal descriptions of the environments they intend to capture. Agents' objectives may di®er from those attributed to them, and even when they coincide agents may not have the sophistication necessary to choose actions which best achieve those objectives. The \as if" viewpoint is a defense of economic theory based on the following argument. Typically, what is at stake in the economic environments is important for survival as a player in that environment (for example, pro¯ts in a market * We thank (but exonerate) Eddie Dekel, who contributed substantially to the ideas in this paper. We also thank an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions.
y Financial support from NSF grant #9810787 is gratefully acknowledged context). Therefore, regardless of the actual motives of real-world agents, an essentially Darwinian mechanism should eventually imply that their behavior is consistent with optimization (else they would not have survived). It should appear to an outside observer who is agnostic about the true decision-making process \as if" it were the outcome of strategically sophisticated interaction among optimizing agents. Game theorists have attempted to formalize one aspect of the viewpoint using models of evolutionary equilibrium. The agents in these models are not rational utility-maximizers, but rather are genetically programmed to play particular actions. These agents interact with one another over time, and evolution selects in favor of those agents whose pre-programmed actions happen to be optimal against the (distribution of) actions of other agents. Evolutionary equilibrium, a situation in which every surviving agent uses an optimal action, provides some support for as if: the distribution of actions in an evolutionary equilibrium must be a Nash equilibrium. This is true for virtually all formalizations of evolutionary equilibrium, e.g. the ESS concept (Maynard Smith [9] ) and its variants, as well as dynamic versions such as the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker [17] ). (See Weibull [19] for a survey.)
There are drawbacks. First of all, while solution concepts based on evolutionary ideas provide predictions which are consistent with Nash equilibrium, they sometimes make no prediction at all (ESS can fail to exist for some games, the replicator dynamics can fail to converge). Secondly, (and it can be argued that these two points are closely linked) they tend to bear too much resemblance to biological models and too little to economics. Even those who are sympathetic to the idea of \bounded rationality" can be skeptical that this extreme behavioral assumption is any more convincing as a model of economic agents.
In this paper we propose an alternative approach to the as if argument. We start by specifying an n-player game G with action sets (A i ) n i=1 , and payo® functions (¼ i ) n i=1 . As in the standard evolutionary framework, we interpret these payo® functions as representing¯tness, and we imagine a population of individuals who are repeatedly randomly matched to play G. Unlike the standard framework, agents in our world are rational decisionmakers. They have preferences over outcomes and they form conjectures about the behavior of other agents. Based on these they make choices which are optimal given their preferences. In our interpretation, however, the term \rational" implies nothing more than this. In particular, it imposes no constraint on the preferences governing these choices (however we do assume that they satisfy the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms). 1 We do not mean to advance the position that rationality implies an expected utility representation of preferences. We assume such a representation because it simpli¯es Which preferences are represented in the population is to be determined endogenously by the evolutionary process.
Slightly more formally, each of n populations (one for each player-role in G) is characterized by a distribution ¹ i over the set £ i of possible utility functions. An individual is drawn independently from each population according to the product probability ¹ = Q n 1 ¹ i to choose actions in G. Selected individuals know their own utility functions, have beliefs about their opponents' play and choose actions to maximize expected utility.
This interaction can be summarized as an n-player game of incomplete information ¡(¹) in which the prior distribution over \type"-pro¯les is ¹, each player observes his realized type, and chooses an action in A i .
We assume that play is described by an equilibrium of ¡(¹). That is, each individual has a correct belief about the distribution of actions he will face and chooses an action which is a best reply to this distribution (according to his own preferences). This equilibrium determines an aggregate distribution of action-pro¯les, which to an outside observer appears as the outcome of the underlying game G.
The preferences that are \¯t" are those that induce choices that are successful relative to the objective payo®s (
. The population distribution of preferences evolves as those that are more¯t grow in representation relative to those that are less¯t. An evolutionary equilibrium is then a distribution of preferences ¹ and an equilibrium of ¡(¹) such that all individuals are equally successful relative to (¼ i )
Our question is whether play in an evolutionary equilibrium will appear to an outside observer as if it were the outcome of Nash equilibrium play by agents whose preferences were actually given by (
To answer this question, we propose a stability criterion for preferences based on the type of evolution discussed above. In the spirit of \static" concepts of evolutionary stability (such as ESS), our criterion is intended to capture the e®ects of mutation and natural selection, while avoiding an explicit model of the evolutionary process. Under our de¯nition, a set S of preference distributions is stable if there is a set U of neighboring distributions such that starting anywhere within U , evolution must result in a return to S. The neighboring distributions are interpreted as the set of possible outcomes of a process of mutation. The \paths" of the evolutionary process are modeled abstractly as selection sequences: sequences of distributions which satisfy a standard \¯tness monotonicity" property.
the analysis and allows us to focus on the question at hand, namely the evolution of preferences over outcomes of strategic interaction. It is indeed interesting to explore the parallel question of whether evolution should imply that behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization. This is a question about the evolution of preferences over uncertain outcomes, hence outside the narrow scope of this paper. Papers which have examined this question include Robson [12] . Robson [13] and To [18] .
A set of outcomes in G is supported by stable preferences if those outcomes can be obtained as the distributions of play within a stable set of preference distributions. We show that every game G has a non-empty set of outcomes that are supported by stable preferences. We take this to be an advantage of the present approach over the standard models built around evolution of strategies, which can fail to generate solutions in many games. However, we must note that, we assume that the population can learn an equilibrium of ¡(¹). A complete foundation for equilibrium would embed a model of learning within our evolutionary framework. See Sandholm [15] for such a model.
By assuming nothing more than monotonicity in selection sequences, we prove that outcomes which are supported by stable preferences must correspond to Nash equilibrium distributions of G. Thus, our model formalizes the argument in favor of the as if viewpoint. Finally, by imposing some weak additional assumptions on selection sequences, we obtain an equilibrium re¯nement: only trembling-hand perfect equilibria can be supported by stable preferences.
A MODEL
We start with an n-player normal form game G with¯nite action sets A i , i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and payo® function ¼ : A !R n , where A = Q n A i : We view ¼ as representing the \true" objective payo®s, or¯tnesses. A player's survival is dependent upon his success in the game as evaluated by ¼. Let ¢ represent the set of probability distributions on A, i.e., the set of outcomes in G, and E ½ ¢ those distributions arising from Nash equilibria of G.
We follow the standard approach to evolutionary equilibrium selection by supposing there are n populations of players, and a process which randomly selects an individual from each population to play G. We depart from the standard approach by assuming these individuals have preferences over outcomes in G, and choose actions optimally in response to beliefs about the play of their selected opponents. However, these preferences are not necessarily represented by ¼.
Let £ i = [0; 1] jAj be the set of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern payo® functions on A. Notice that with this speci¯cation, each preference ordering is represented by a continuum of distinct, but equivalent, payo® functions. For example, £ i contains a continuum of a±ne transformations of ¼. This equivalence class of preferences will play an important role and will be denoted e ¼. The set of possible n-vectors µ of payo® functions is £ = Q n 1 £ i , and can be thought of as the set of all games with action set A.
The environment will be characterized by a product probability measure ¹ on £ representing the current distributions of preferences in each of the n populations.
2 It simpli¯es some arguments to assume that these distributions are non-atomic. Let P(£) be the set of all non-atomic probability measures ¹ on £ such that ¹ = ¹ 1 £ ¹ 2 £ : : : £ ¹ n . Denote by C(¹) the support of the preference distribution ¹. 3 The matching process selects individuals from population i according to the distribution ¹ i , independently of the players drawn from other populations. Independence captures our implicit assumption that each drawn player learns nothing about the preferences of his realized opponents. This is an important feature of our model that distinguishes it from e.g. GÄ uth and Yaari [5] who assume that players perfectly observe one anothers' preferences. In Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya [3] we study a more general model which includes independence and perfect observability as special cases, as well as intermediate informational assumptions. This interaction can be described as an n-player Bayesian game ¡(¹) in which the set of possible states of the world is £ and the common prior distribution is ¹. We are going to assume that aggregate play among the populations is an equilibrium of this game. That is, we will assume that each individual, upon being selected to play, will have correct beliefs about the distribution over his opponents' play and will choose an action that is a best-reply to this belief, given his own preferences.
While it is not a part of our formal model, we view equilibrium as arising from a process of learning which operates much faster than the evolutionary process we seek to model. To be speci¯c, our model will describe the evolution of the type distribution ¹. We suppose that whenever a new distribution º arises as a consequence of evolutionary forces, the learning process always reaches equilibrium with respect to ¡(º) before subsequent evolution proceeds.
4
A pure strategy pro¯le in ¡(¹) is a measurable function ¾ : £ ! A specifying an action pro¯le in G for every possible payo® pro¯le. Let § be the set of pure strategy pro¯les. In our evolutionary model, we will assume that each individual knows only his own payo® function when choosing an action, and never randomizes. Hence § = Q n i=1 § i where § i is the set of maps ¾ i : £ i ! A i : Whenever ¹ is¯xed, we will view § as a topological space of random variables on the measure space (£; ¹) with the topology ¿ ¹ of convergence in measure.
5 Given a pro¯le of strategies ¾ 2 §, the utility of player i is the random variable µ i (¾(µ)). The¯tness of player i is the random variable
The outcome of play, denoted x ¹ (¾), is the distribution of ¾, which is an element of ¢.
In the model we have described, a player cares only about the distribution over opponents' actions, not the opponents' types. We will therefore simplify notation by de¯ning best-replies as functions of outcomes, rather than strategy pro¯les. The pure action best-reply correspondence for a given game µ is
and the pure strategy best-reply correspondence in ¡(¹) is
In the above notation, E ¹ denotes expectation with respect to the measure ¹, and µ i (¾ i ; x ¡i ) is the random utility to player i when using strategy ¾ i against the opponents' distribution of play x ¡i . We assume that the aggregate distribution of play can be described by an equilibrium in ¡(¹). A pure-strategy equilibrium in ¡(¹) is a pro¯le ¾ of pure strategies with distribution x such that for each i, ¾ i 2¯¹(x). Because we have restricted attention to non-atomic distributions, the results of Milgrom and Weber [10] and Radner and Rosenthal [11] imply that the restriction to pure-strategies entails no loss of generality. In particular, for any ¹ 2 P (£), there is at least one equilibrium of ¡(¹) in pure strategies, and for any \mixed" equilibrium there is a \puri¯cation," i.e., a pure strategy equilibrium which is equivalent in all relevant respects.
We conclude this section with the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2.1.
1.For every µ 2 £, and
Proof. The¯rst point follows immediately from the continuity of the utility functions µ. The second is due to the fact that for any given opposing distribution x, two best-replies can di®er on a set of measure zero, but nowhere else.
To prove the third, it su±ces to show that for every " > 0, there exists a ± > 0 such that if kx ¡ x k< ± and ¾ 2¯¹(x) then ¹(fµ : ¾(µ) 2 B µ (x)g) > 1¡". Let X be a subset of £ of ¹-measure at least 1¡" and let ± = inf X ± µ where ± µ is as de¯ned in the¯rst part of this Lemma. Then if kx ¡ x k< ±, and if ¾ 2¯¹¤(x); then ¹ ¤ (fµ :
MUTATION AND SELECTION
The central question of this paper is whether evolutionary forces, acting on the preferences in the population, will bring about distributions ¹ such that equilibrium play ¾ 2 E(¹) is in E, i.e., corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the true game. In our analysis of this question, we do not develop an explicit model of the evolutionary process. Instead, we follow in the spirit of \static" notions of evolutionary stability such as ESS (Maynard Smith [9] ; also see the second chapter of Weibull [19] for a survey of this approach). That is, we propose criteria which characterize \stable" sets of preference distributions, and argue that these criteria capture the important features of unmodeled evolution.
Our criterion for evolutionary stability of preferences has the usual two components: natural selection, the process by which unsuccessful types are replaced by successful types, and mutation, the process by which previously unrepresented types can enter the population. Roughly, an outcome x 2 ¢ is supported by stable preferences if the preferences which support the outcome are stable under natural selection, and robust to mutation. We discuss these features in the present section.
Our representation of mutations is a generalization of the representation found in traditional concepts of evolutionary stability. ESS, for example, tests the stability of an outcome by ensuring its robustness against small perturbations of the population strategy pro¯le. Essentially this amounts to verifying that evolutionary forces will restore the original pro¯le starting from any pro¯le in some arbitrarily small neighborhood. The implicit idea is that players' strategies are subject to mutation, but we can be sure that the aggregate pro¯le cannot move far before forces of natural selection come to dominate.
In our model, evolutionary forces operate on the distribution of preferences in the population. We therefore need to characterize the types of preference distributions which can come about as a consequence of mutation, starting from an arbitrary initial distribution ¹. There are two criteria for a de¯nition of neighborhoods of post-mutation distributions. The¯rst is that they be su±ciently rich so as to allow all combinations of types to enter the population. The second is that they be \bounded," capturing the idea that mutation operates slowly.
A notion of closeness which meets these criteria is the following. A neighborhood of a type distribution ¹ 2 P (£) is a set U of full-support distributions such that for some " > 0, k ¹ ¡ º k< " for all º 2 U . If S is a set of type distributions, then a neighborhood of S is the union of neighborhoods of the elements of S.
An important implication of our use of the norm as a measure of closeness is the following. If ¹(X) > 0 for some subset of types X, then there is a neighborhood of ¹ such that every element º of this neighborhood has the property º(X) > 0.
Individuals in the population choose actions which are optimal relative to their preferences. However, the objective success of an action is determined by the true payo® function ¼. A process of natural selection operates on the types in the population, favoring those types which are most \¯t" relative to the current environment. Formally, we assume that the distribution ¹ evolves according to the relative success, evaluated according to ¼, of the equilibrium actions being used by individuals of various types.
Our goal is to incorporate as much of the consequences of such dynamics as possible without restricting attention to any speci¯c process. To do this, we construct sequences of distributions, called selection sequences which can be considered abstract \paths" of the evolutionary process. Each step of the sequence is assumed to satisfy a standard \payo® monotonicity" property (see Weibull [19] ). A pair of distributions (¹ 1 ; ¹ 2 ) is a selection step relative to ¾ if ¾ 2 E(¹ 1 ), ¹ 2 ¿ ¹ 1 and for each i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and for
Evolution will be assumed to continue until a distribution and equilibrium are reached that are invariant, i.e., any selection step is trivial. A distribution ¹ is stable with respect to outcome x 2 ¢ if there is some equilibrium ¾ 2 E(¹), whose distribution is x and such that there exist constants c i such that for each i,
Note that stability is de¯ned with respect to a particular equilibrium in E(¹). It may be helpful to think of the \state" of the system as the pair consisting of a preference distribution ¹ and an equilibrium ¾. If ¹ is stable with respect to the distribution of ¾, then this pair constitutes a candidate \rest point" of the system. This is because in such a state, ¹-almost every member of each population i is earning the same¯tness c i and thus natural selection does not favor any set of types over another. Thus, if (¹; ¹ 0 ) is a selection step relative to ¾, then ¹ 0 = ¹. The notation ±(¹) will represent the set of outcomes with respect to which ¹ is stable. If S is a set of distributions, then ±(S) is the set [ ¹2S ±(¹). Say that the set S is stable with respect to the set of outcomes O if ±(¹) 6 = ; for each ¹ 2 S and if ±(S) = O.
In general, stability with respect to outcome x implies nothing about x. However, as long as the support of the type distribution intersects1, the class of preferences which are equivalent to the true preferences, stability implies that x is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose1 \ C(¹) 6 = ; and x is the distribution of some equilibrium ¾ 2 E(¹). Then ¹ is stable with respect to x if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of G:
Proof. Suppose ¹ is stable with respect to x. Then there is an equilibrium ¾ 2 E(¹) whose distribution is x for which ¼ i (¾ i (µ i ); x ¡i ) = c i for ¹ ialmost every type µ i . Since ¾ 2 E(¹), almost every type-pro¯le µ is playing a µ best-response to x. By the¯rst part of Lemma 2.1, there is an open neighborhood V of1 such that for every type pro¯le µ in this neighborhood, the set of µ best-responses is a subset of the set of ¼ best-responses. Sincẽ ¼ \ C(¹) 6 = ;, V has positive probability under ¹. Therefore, a positive fraction of the population is playing a ¼ best-response to x. But since almost every member of each population is earning the same ¼ payo®, almost everyone is playing a ¼ best-response to x. Since x is the distribution of play in which a best-response to x is played with probability 1, x is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose x is a Nash equilibrium of G and that x is the distribution of some ¾ 2 E(¹). Since x is a Nash equilibrium, each action in the support of x is a best-response to x, and hence earns the same ¼ payo® against x. Since x is the distribution of ¾, almost every member of the population is playing some action in the support of x and therefore earning the same ¼ payo®.
To reach a stable preference distribution, selection may have to operate for more than a¯nite number of steps. We de¯ne a selection sequence to be any in¯nite sequence of distributions which satisfy the payo® monotonicity property.
Definition 3.4.
A sequence of pairs f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g is a selection sequence if for every k, (¹ k ; ¹ k+1 ) is a selection step relative to ¾ k .
Say that a selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g converges if there is a distribution ¹ ¤ such that ¹ k ! ¹ ¤ in norm. We will call the preference distribution ¹ ¤ the limit point of the selection sequence. Not every selection sequence converges. 6 However, Proposition 4.1 below shows that if ¹ 0 (1) > 0, then every selection sequence beginning with ¹ 0 converges.
It is important to bear in mind that convergence of a selection sequence is de¯ned by convergence of the preference distribution. Because we have assumed little more than payo® monotonicity in selection sequences, there is no guarantee that even a convergent selection sequence has a limit point that is stable. Even when the distribution of preferences converges to ¹ ¤ and the distribution of play converges to x ¤ , it may be that ¹ ¤ is not stable with respect to x ¤ or any other equilibrium distribution for ¹ ¤ . For a trivial example, note that a constant sequence is a selection sequence, but the limit is only stable if the initial point was stable. Therefore, it is possible that the selection will continue to occur once the limit is reached.
We could impose assumptions which rule out such ill-behaved selection sequences (for example, focusing on a particular class of dynamic processes which satisfy a continuity assumption). We choose instead to make this assumption implicit by simply ignoring selection sequences which converge to unstable limit points and restricting attention to the stable limit points (when they exist). We do this because the logic of our results rely only on the payo® monotonicity of selection sequences, independent of the particular dynamic process that generates them. Because our de¯nition of a stable set of preferences requires that following a mutation, every selection sequence converges and all stable limit points of all selection sequences belong to the stable set, our results would apply to any discrete time dynamic system with the appropriate continuity property.
7 Let L(¹) be the set of stable limit points of all selection sequences that start with ¹.
STABILITY
In this section we introduce the¯rst of two stability de¯nitions. We say that a set of outcomes O is supported by stable preferences if there is a set S of preference distributions which are stable with respect to that set of outcomes, and a neighborhood U of S from which selection must return to S. Without imposing any further restrictions on selection sequences we show that every game has a set of outcomes that is supported by stable preferences and every such set is contained in the set of Nash equilibria. A set O ½ ¢ of outcomes is supported by stable preferences if it is a minimal non-empty closed set with the following property. There exists a subset S ½ P(£) which is stable with respect to O and a neighborhood U of S such that for all º 2 U , every selection sequence beginning with º converges and ; 6 = L(º) ½ S We begin with an existence result. Every game has at least one set of outcomes that is supported by stable preferences.
The proof of this theorem relies on some properties of selection sequences which we now establish. Proof. Let f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g be a selection sequence beginning with ¹ 0 . For every k and every equilibrium of ¡(¹ k ), the types in1 play actions that maximize ¼. Therefore, by the de¯nition of a selection step, the sequence ¹ k (1) is weakly increasing. Since ¹ k (1) 2 (0; 1] the sequence must converge, implying that
To show that ¹ k converges, we will show that it converges in norm, i.e., that k ¹ k ¡¹ k¡1 k! 0. For this it is su±cient to show k (¹ k ¡¹ k¡1 ) + k! 0. Let X be the support of (¹ k ¡ ¹ k¡1 )
+ . By the de¯nition of a selection step
and we have shown that the right-hand side converges to zero.
Then there exists a convergent selection sequence beginning with ¹ 0 whose limit is stable.
Proof. This is a consequence of Proposition 5.1 which will be proven in Section 5.
We can now give a proof of Theorem 4.1 Proof. Let G be a game with payo® function ¼. Every Nash equilibrium of G can be supported as an equilibrium of ¡(±1) where ±1 is any non-atomic type distribution concentrated on1. By Proposition 3.1, these distributions are stable. Therefore the set S of type distributions ¹ that are stable with respect to the set E and for which ¹(1) > 0 is non-empty. Furthermore, for every neighboring type distribution º; º(1) > 0 and Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 imply that every selection sequence beginning with º converges and ; 6 = L(º) ½ S.
Thus the closed set E satis¯es the criteria in the de¯nition, and by the usual Zorn's lemma argument (for example, see Kohlberg We now show that only Nash equilibria can be stable. We will need the following lemma in the proof.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose ¹; º are distributions each of which has an equilibrium whose distribution is x. Then for any s 2 (0; 1), the distribution s¹ + (1 ¡ s)º has an equilibrium whose distribution is x.
Proof. Let ¾ and°be the equilibria of ¹ and º respectively. Consider the behavior strategy 83 (µ) = s¾(µ)+(1¡s)°(µ). This is an equilibrium of ¡(s¹+(1¡s)º) in behavior strategies because each type is randomizing over best-replies. Clearly its distribution is x. Milgrom and Weber [10] prove that any such equilibrium has a puri¯cation, i.e., a pure strategy equilibrium with the same distribution. Proof. Let O be a set of outcomes that is supported by stable preferences. Then there is a set S of type distributions which are stable with respect to O and a neighborhood U ¹ of each ¹ 2 S such that if º 2 U ¹ , then every selection sequence beginning with º converges and ; 6 = L(º) ½ S: Every such neighborhood contains a º 2 F´fô :v(1) > 0g. By Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we have ; 6 = L(º) ½ F . Therefore F \ S 6 = ;. Proposition 3.1 implies ±(F \ S) ½ E, and by de¯nition ±(F \ S) ½ O. Let Q´E \ O. Q is closed because both E and O are, and because F \ S 6 = ;, Proposition 3.1 implies Q 6 = ;.
Suppose ±(F \ S) = Q. Then Q satis¯es the criteria for supported by stable preferences using the neighborhood
On the other hand, if x 2 Q n ±(F \ S), then there is a ¹ 2 S n F which is stable with respect to x. Let ¶ be any distribution concentrated on1. Since x is a Nash equilibrium, all actions with positive probability are bestreplies under1 so that any strategy which has distribution x in ¡( ¶) is an equilibrium of ¡( ¶) (such strategies exist because distributions are assumed atomless).
Lemma 4.1 implies that for any s 2 (0; 1), the probability
has an equilibrium°whose distribution is x. For s small enough º is inside U ¹ . Let U º be a neighborhood of º contained in U ¹ with radius no greater than s. Then for every º 0 in U º , º 0 (1) > 0 so that every selectin sequence beginning with º converges and ; 6 = L(º 0 ) ½ L(U ¹ ) ½ S \ F: Thus, S \ F together with all distributions constructed in this manner constitute a stable set of type distributions that support Q. Finally, since O is supported by stable preferences it is minimal, hence O = Q ½ E.
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section we established that under very general conditions, outcomes which are supported by stable preferences must be Nash equilibria. In this section we show that mild additional assumptions ensure that only trembling-hand perfect equilibria can be supported by stable preferences.
We¯rst impose some weak regularity conditions on selection sequences. The¯rst condition, which we call bounded death rates ensures that selection does not stop \too early." In particular, the rate at which successful types grow is asymptotically bounded below. The second condition,¯nite death rates prevents types from becoming completely extinct in one step. A feature of this assumption which plays an important role in this section is that types for whom a given strategy is dominant can never be completely eliminated.
As a¯nal modi¯cation of this section, we pay more attention to the sequence of play along an evolutionary path. Suppose ¹ ¤ is the limit of a selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g within some stable set of distributions. We restrict the equilibria of ¹ ¤ to those which are approximated asymptotically by the sequence of equilibria ¾ k . In doing so, we are implicitly assuming a sort of continuity in the evolution of equilibrium play. We do not use ¹ ¤ as support for some outcome x for which x is not an accumulation point of the distribution of play along the sequence.
Given a selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g, let x k be the distribution of play in period k, and let
This is the set of types which are not maximizing¯tness in period k. A selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g has bounded death rates if lim sup
A selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g has¯nite death rates if ¹ k ¿ ¹ k+1 for every k.
These assumptions are weak and are satis¯ed for example by the replicator dynamics. The following characterizes the behavior of such selection sequences.
sequence beginning with ¹ 0 with¯nite and bounded death rates, then there exists a stable ¹ ¤ such that ¹ k ! ¹ ¤ : Moreover, every accumulation point of x k is a perfect equilibrium of G which is the distribution of some equilibrium of ¡(¹ ¤ ).
Proof. For every k we have
Subtracting 1 from both sides
Under the assumption of bounded death rates, there exists " > 0 and ¹ k such that for all k > ¹ k, the right-hand side is greater than (1¡")¹ k¡1 (W k¡1 ). Therefore, for all such k,
Taking limits as k goes to in¯nity, Proposition 4.1 implies that ¹ k ! ¹ ¤ , hence the left-hand side converges to 0. We therefore conclude
Now let x be an accumulation point of the sequence x k of play, and consider a subsequence f(¹ l ; ¾ l )g of f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g whose play is converging to x.
We have shown that ¹ l (W l ) ! 0. Thus, for every " > 0 there exists a ¹ l(") such that l > ¹ l(") implies ¹ l (W l ) < ". Furthermore, the assumption of¯nite death rates implies x l is completely mixed for every l. 9 In other words, x l is an "-perfect equilibrium distribution for every l > ¹ l(").
We can thus choose any sequence " z ! 0, and the corresponding sequence x¹ l("n) is a sequence of " n -perfect equilibria. Therefore x is a perfect equilibrium outcome of G. We wish to show that there is an equilibrium of ¡(¹ ¤ ) whose distribution is x. The upper hemi-continuity of¯¹¤ implies that for every neighborhood U of¯¹¤(x) there is a ¹ l such that l > ¹ l implies¯¹¤(x l ) ½ U. Now ¹ ¤ ¿ ¹ l follows from norm convergence, hence by Lemma 2.1 we have¯¹ l 1 ¹ ¤ , and therefore ¾ k 2¯¹ k (x k ) ½ U . Thus all ¿ ¹ ¤ -accumulation points of ¾ k are in¯¹¤(x). Let ¾ ¤ be any one of them. Convergence in mean implies convergence in distribution, hence x must be the distribution of ¾ ¤ . We conclude that ¾ ¤ is an equilibrium of ¡(¹ ¤ ) with distribution x.
This result motivates an alternative de¯nition of support by stable preferences. Under the previous de¯nition, the stable set of outcomes must include all stable equilibria of elements of the stable set of preferences. Under this alternative de¯nition, we include only those equilibria that are accumulation points of play along the selection sequence. Proposition 5.1 makes it clear that such a requirement will imply a re¯nement of de¯nition 4.1
For the remainder, unless otherwise noted, we will restrict attention to selection sequences with bounded,¯nite death rates. We now de¯ne a limit point of a selection sequence f(¹ k ; ¾ k )g to be a pair (¹ ¤ ; ¾ ¤ ) 2 P(£) £ § where ¹ ¤ is the norm limit of ¹ k and ¾ ¤ is a ¿ ¹ ¤ accumulation point of ¾ k . In general, while there can be only one limit of ¹ k , there may be multiple accumulation points of ¾ k , hence a selection sequence can have more than one limit. Let L ¤ (¹ 0 ) denote the set of limits of selection sequences starting with ¹ 0 .
Some additional notation will come in handy. A re¯nement is a correspondence ½ : S ! § whose domain is a subset S of P(£), satisfying ½(¹) ½ E(¹).
We will now say that a pair (¹; ¾) is stable with respect to outcome x if ¾ is an equilibrium of ¡(¹) with distribution x and there is a¯tness pro¯le c = (c i ) n i=1 such that for each i, ¼ i (¾ i ; x ¡i ) = c i for ¹-almost every type µ i . Represent by ±(¹; ¾) the set of outcomes with respect to which (¹; ¾) is stable. Say that a re¯nement ½ is stable with respect to the set of outcomes O ½ ¢ if ±(') 6 = ; for each ' 2 graph½ and [ '2graph½ ±(') = O: A set O ½ ¢ of outcomes is strongly supported by stable preferences if it is a minimal non-empty closed set with the following property. There exists a S ½ P(£) and a re¯nement on S which is stable with respect to O and if for each ¹ 2 S there is a neighborhood U of ¹ such that for each º 2 U , º 6 = ¹, every selection sequence beginning with º converges and ; 6 = L ¤ (º) ½ graph½ With Proposition 5.1 in hand, we can mimic the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 to establish the following.
Theorem 5.1. Every game G has a set of outcomes that is strongly supported by stable preferences. A set of outcomes is strongly supported by stable preferences only if it consists of perfect equilibrium distributions of G.
CONCLUSION
We conclude with a summary of the advantages of our approach to evolutionary equilibrium foundations.
One of the main goals of evolutionary game theory has been to provide a foundation for Nash equilibrium and perhaps argue in favor of some of its re¯nements. Models based on evolution of strategies such as ESS and related dynamic models have been partially successful. Generally speaking, outcomes that satisfy these types of evolutionary stability criteria must be Nash equilibria, and in many cases must satisfy re¯nements incorporating backward and forward induction ideas. A major drawback of this approach, however, has been that evolutionarily stable strategies often fail to exist.
We have based our solution concept on a model of strategic interaction among rational agents whose preferences are subject to evolutionary forces. We¯nd this an appealing alternative prima facie as a model of economic behavior. The results of this paper show that the model has further advantages. First, every game has at least one outcome that is supported by stable preferences (theorem 4.1). Additionally, we preserve the standard \only if Nash" result (theorem 4.2) and show support for a traditional equilibrium re¯nement (theorem 5.1). These results are obtained by imposing a minimum of structure on the model of natural selection. Finally, our model suggests a natural solution to one of the fundamental conceptual di±culties of equilibrium theory: the interpretation of mixed strategies. In our model, individuals never randomize. Mixed outcomes only appear random to an observer outside the model who has no information about the exact preferences of the individuals playing G. Our model thus demonstrates how evolution of preferences leads to puri¯cation of mixed equilibria.
